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Abstract
Tort law’s compensation objective can justify : (i) the governmental support to bail out TEPCO under the Act to Es-
tablish Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation of 2011; and (ii) the governmental interpretation to dis-
qualify the 3/11 tsunami from liability-exempting-grave-natural disasters under the old Act on Compensation for Nu-
clear Damage of 1961. However, the government should educate the public about nuclear operation’s safety limitation
to neutralize over-deterrence created by the above (ii) interpretation.
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INTRODUCTION
A large amount of radioactive leakage from
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
(“Fukushima Daiichi”or “NPS”) operated by
Tokyo Electric Power Company (“TEPCO”) was
said to be caused mainly by a huge tsunami oc-
curred on March 11, 2011.1)
TEPCO had assumed that a tsunami could
reach at maximum 5.4m in height, against which
TEPCO had taken countermeasures. But the
3/11 tsunami, reaching 14-15m (46ft) in height2)
“beyond the scope of assumption”taken by
TEPCO, overwhelmed the countermeasures. Its
floodwater submerged cooling systems of NPS,
caused total blackouts, and led to multiple hydro-
gen explosions, multiple reactors meltdowns, and
a large amount of radioactive leakage. The radio-
active leakage inflicted huge amounts of losses on
residents and business especially around NPS.
Since then, the phrase,“beyond the scope of as-
sumption (soutei-gai or 想定外 ),”has become un-
popular among a populace in Japan because
TEPCO or those who have been involved in pro-
motion of nuclear power business (who are called
“nuclear power village［people］”) repeatedly said
that the 3/11 tsunami was “beyond the scope of
Figure 1: Fukushima Daiichi’s Location
Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Location of Fukushima Daiichi in Japan, Great East Japan
Earthquake and the seismic damage to the NPS, as of 15 : 30 June 25th, 2011 (JST), available at
http : //www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/110625_1530_factsheet.pdf (last visited on July 2, 2011).
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［their］assumption”; this phrase has sounded like
a pretext to evade responsibility for causing the
incident, even though the 3/11 tsunami was re-
ally huge and its occurrence had only a slim pos-
sibility.3) When the Fukushima Daiichi incident
happened, the only available statute which realis-
tically could compensate victims of the incident
was the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Dam-
age (Act No. 147 of 1961 as amended) (“Nuclear
Damage Compensation Act” or “the Act”). The
Act sets forth that a nuclear operator (including
TEPCO) shall be strictly and limitlessly liable for
nuclear damage that occurred due to reactor op-
eration. For the security of liability borne by a
nuclear operator, the Act requires each nuclear
operator to maintain a financial security (“Finan-
cial Security”), amounting to JPY 120 billion (US
$1.4 billion) per each nuclear power site, to be ob-
tained from a private insurance market or
through some public arrangements, such as de-
posit at the national treasury.4) The Act, how-
ever, sets forth that the nuclear operator should
be exempted from the liability in case the nuclear
damage was caused by “a grave natural disaster
of an exceptional character.”5)
Whereas the 3/11 tsunami was so unexception-
ally huge and rare, the government has kept on
taking a stance that TEPCO should not be ex-
empted from liability,6) even though there were
strong arguments against it.7) And TEPCO vol-
untarily has admitted its liability and has impli-
edly accepted the governmental interpretation,8)
while no court has rendered its opinion which has
found TEPCO liable by denying the 3/11 tsu-
nami’s qualification as a grave natural disaster of
an exceptional character.9) The above govern-
mental interpretation has provided some mes-
Figure 2: A Post-Disaster Picture on Fukushima Dai-
ichi
Source: Nuclear and Industry Safety Agency (NISA), April 4,
2011, at IAEA and Government Report to the IAEA, June 7,
2011, cited in Tatsujiro Suzuki, Vice Chairman, Japan Atomic
Energy Commission, Berlin, July 1, 2011, The Fukushima Nu-
clear Accident: Lessons learned (so far) and possible implica-
tions, at page 19, available at http : //www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/
about/kettei/110701b.pdf (last visited on July 3, 2012).
Figure 3: Evacuation Zone around Fukushima Daiichi
Source: Great East Japan Earthquake Taskforce, Science
Council of Japan, Figure 2. Evacuation zone around
Fukushima Daiichi Atomic Power Plant as of May 2, 2011, in
Report to the Foreign Academies from Science Council of Ja-
pan on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident,
May 2, 2011, at page 23, available at http : //www.scj.go.jp/en/
report/houkoku-110502-7.pdf (last visited on July 2, 2012).
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sages to the public as follows: (i) an occurrence of
a tsunami with a huge scale equivalent to the
3/11 one at or around Fukushima Daiichi was
foreseeable; (ii) the incident could, and should,
have been prevented; and (iii) TEPCO was culpa-
ble for failing to take precautions against the mul-
tiple meltdowns and huge radioactive leakage re-
sulted from the huge tsunami’s floodwater.
These messages automatically have made the
public have a feeling that TEPCO should not be
supported by tax payers’ money even if it would
become insolvent due to its unlimited (and tens of
billions of dollars of) liability.10)
On the contrary to the public perception about
the governmental interpretation, the government
thereafter published its policy to support finan-
cially TEPCO11) so that it could survive as a going
concern even though its debts for damages for
the victims could reach a skyrocketed amount.
To implement the policy to allow TEPCO to sur-
vive, the government prepared a bill whose title
was “the Act to Establish Nuclear Damage Com-
pensation Facilitation Corporation” (Act No. 94 of
2011) (“Compensation Facilitation Corporation
Act” or “the Act”) and had it passed in the Na-
tional Diet on August 3, 2011. Because this Act
and the governmental policy behind the Act have
looked inconsistent with the public perception
created by the governmental interpretation label-
ing TEPCO as a wrongdoer, the Act and policy
behind it have not seemed to be fully acceptable
to the public and mass media.12)
The above governmental behavior faces some
difficulty in the context of torts, too. On the one
hand, assuming that the 3/11 tsunami should
qualify as “a grave natural disaster of an excep-
tional character” as argued by some commenta-
tors including multiple leading law scholars13) and
that the resulting large radioactive leakage was
(arguably) beyond TEPCO’s control, it seems to
be against fairness14) to impose on TEPCO liabil-
ity for harms caused by the exceptionally huge
tsunami which was “beyond the scope of assump-
tion.” On the other hand, however, assuming that
TEPCO was culpable for failure to avoid the inci-
dent as argued by the other commentators15) and
the government,16) it seems to be against correc-
tive justice, on which tort law is partly based, to
have allowed the wrongdoer not to pay for dam-
ages out of its own assets. In addition to that, the
governmental policy to support TEPCO, who is
strictly liable under the govermental interpreta-
tion, apparently seems: (i) to mean undesirable
externalization of social costs produced by
TEPCO’s abnormally dangerous activity; and (ii)
to lead to under-deterrence as well as moral haz-
ard. Consequently, the governmental behavior
looks inconsistent and is difficult to be explained
to the public and from the tort law’s objectives (i.e.,
fairness and deterrence).
The governmental behavior can, however, be
explained from a political viewpoint which puts
top priorities on (i) compensating victims and (ii)
avoiding further disasters, as explained in the
body of this piece. Part I will explain why the ap-
parently inconsistent policy can be explained
from a compensation perspective. And Part II
will explain additional reasons which justify the
governmental policy to allow TEMCO to survive.
Part III will add another ground based on which
the government has decided to use tax payers’
money to support financially TEPCO. And finally
Part IV will criticize bad side effects to be caused
by the governmental interpretation including its
Investigation Committee’s Interim Report.
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I. COMPENSATION FIRST
The current governmental policy seems to
put its highest priority on quick and adequate
compensation of victims of the Fukushima Dai-
ichi incident.17) This priority can explain why the
government took an apparently inconsistent atti-
tude where it has not exempted TEPCO from li-
ability and thereafter it has financially supported
the wrongdoer, TEPCO.
A. The Core Reason for Not Exempting
TEPCO from Liability Regardless of an
Apparent “Grave Natural Disaster of an
Exceptional Character”
1. Problems Inherent in the Nuclear Damage
Compensation Act
When the Fukushima Daiichi incident hap-
pened, the only statute which was practically
available for the government to implement imme-
diately compensation of victims was the Nuclear
Damage Compensation Act. But the Act was
not a well-drafted statute, from a victim-
compensation viewpoint, mainly because it was
different from recommendations (“WAGATSUMA
Recommendations”)18) in which the statute origi-
nated.
(a) WAGATSUMA Recommendations prior to the
Legislation of the Act
WAGATSUMA Recommendations, which be-
came the basis of the enactment of the Act, were
submitted to the Chair of Japan Atomic Energy
Commission, Mr. Yasuhiro NAKASONE (who has
belonged to the conservative Liberal Democratic
Party, LDP, and who later became the Prime
Minister of Japan when Mr. Ronald Reagan was
the President of the U.S.). WAGATSUMA Recom-
mendations were prepared by a blue ribbon com-
mittee whose chair was the authoritative civil law
scholar, Dr. Sakae WAGATSUMA. WAGATSUMA
Recommendations were drafted based on a prin-
ciple that the government should finally compen-
sate victims so that no victims would be left un-
Figure 4: WAGATSUMA Recommendations Explained in JURISUTO
“JURISUTO,” a leading commercial law journal in Japan, issued in 1961, which featured a legal system for
nuclear damage compensation when the Act was legislated. Cornell Law Library’s collection.
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compensated in case losses are not covered by a
nuclear operator’s insurance.19) And this principle
seems to have been based on a sort of social wel-
fare and distributive justice. That intention was
typically reflected by a statement made by Dr.
WAGATSUMA in a leading law review article as
follows: “Nobody would oppose an idea that a
whole of the nation should finally bear losses,
rather than leaving them on the shoulders of un-
lucky victims who happen to be around a nuclear
power station, as far as the government would
dare to promote unprecedented nuclear business
as national policy.” 20)
And WAGATSUMA Recommendations urged
to collect contributions from nuclear operators in
order for the government to compensate victims
for the losses exceeding their insurance coverage;
they also urged to consider making nuclear op-
erators reimburse the expenses incurred by the
government to pay for the damages for the vic-
tims. 21)
(b) The Act subsequent to WAGATSUMA Rec-
ommendations
Notwithstanding the WAGATSUMA Recom-
mendations, the Act, a bill for which was pre-
pared by the then government (of LDP), has not
thoroughly reflected the original principle in
which no victims should be left uncompensated.
For example, in case of nuclear damage caused
by a grave natural disaster of an exceptional
character, Section 17 of the Act sets forth that
“the Government shall take the necessary meas-
ures to relieve victims and to prevent the damage
from spreading.” (emphasis added) This govern-
mental duty does not include compensation. 22) In
other words, in case the grave natural disaster
causes nuclear damage, victims would be left un-
compensated. 23) This lack of compensation was
not intended by the WAGATSUMA Recommen-
dations; on the contrary, they did recommend
that in case of the grave natural disaster the gov-
ernment should compensate the victims, while a
nuclear operator should be exempted from strict
liability in that case because the statute should
not be absolute liability. 24)
What worsens the victims’ situation is the
channeling of liability exclusively to a nuclear op-
erator under the Act. The channeling of liability
prohibits victims from seeking compensation
from entities other than the operator. 25) Thus, if
a nuclear operator were exempted from liability
due to the grave natural disaster, victims could
Figure 5: Gaps of Compensation
Dr. WAGATSUMA criticized the Act for failure to command
the government to compensate the areas of“C” (losses exceed-
ing Financial Security: §17 of the Act) and“D” (losses caused
by a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character: §16 of
the Act). WAGATSUMA, Two Nuclear Power Acts, supra note
［20］, at 7. JURISUTO issued in 1961 in Cornell Law Library’s col-
lection.
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not receive compensation from not only the nu-
clear operator but also suppliers or contractors of
the operator. 26)
And for losses exceeding coverage secured by
Financial Security (e.g., insurance) for a nuclear
operator’s liability, the Act has not thoroughly re-
flected the recommended principle that the gov-
ernment always should finally compensate vic-
tims. While Section 16 of the Act sets forth the
governmental duty to support a nuclear operator
in case of damages exceeding Financial Security,
it puts two conditions precedent to the duty. The
duty would accrue only when: (A) the govern-
ment deems the support necessary; and (B) the
National Diet approves it. This conditional duty
was heavily criticized then by both the leading
civil law scholars and nuclear industry because
on the one hand a nuclear operator was clearly
imposed of limitless liability, on the other hand
the government did not commit clearly to sup-
port the operator who would bear enormous li-
ability exceeding its financial capacity.27)
2. Political Interpretation: To Compensate
Victims, the 3/11 Tsunami Should Not Be
Treated as “a Grave Natural Disaster of an
Exceptional Character”
As explained above, the only statute practi-
cally available to victims for compensation failed
to compensate them in case of: (i) losses caused
by “a grave natural disaster of an exceptional
character”; or (ii) damages exceeding the Finan-
cial Security covering a nuclear operator. Thus,
in order to realize compensation based on the
statute for the Fukushima-Daiichi-incident vic-
tims, the government had to fill in the gaps
caused by (i) and (ii). Therefore, firstly the gov-
ernment had no choice but to make TEPCO ac-
cept an interpretation that the 3/11 tsunami did
not qualify as the “grave natural disaster of an ex-
ceptional character,” even though how rarely
huge actually it was. And secondly, the govern-
ment should: (A) decide that it was necessary to
financially support TEPCO; and (B) obtain the
National Diet’s approval for the financial support.
Consequently, the governmental behavior
which seems inconsistent on its face could be ex-
plained from a principle of compensation. It is
true that the governmental interpretation not ex-
empting TEPCO from liability regardless of the
huge 3/11 tsunami sounds odd to some commen-
tators.28) And it is also true that the governmen-
tal policy to financially support TEPCO after la-
beling it as a liable entity (which means a wrong-
doer) sounds odd to the public and mass media.29)
But this peculiar interpretation and policy taken
by the current government could be justified to
achieve compensation of the victims. Without
this peculiar interpretation and policy, it might be
difficult for the government to implement quick
and adequate compensation of the victims.30)
B. A Core Reason for Keeping TEMCO as a
Going Concern: A Bailout Scheme
An objective of compensating victims (on
which the government put a priority) can explain
why the government determined to support
TEPCO financially. While TEPCO was not ex-
empted from liability and its liability was unlim-
ited theoretically under the Act, its financial ca-
pacity was limited practically. The Financial Se-
curity covering Fukushima Daiichi was only JPY
120 billion (US $1.4 billion) which was too small to
compensate the enormous losses caused by the
large amount of radioactive contamination.31)
The assets of TEPCO themselves were not
enough, even though TEPCO’s financial scale
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In other words, the damages that TEPCO should
pay for would definitely exceed its financial capa-
bility. No financial institute would lend money to
such an entity without someone’s support like
governmental guarantees. Then, TEPCO would
become insolvent. In that case, victims of the
Fukushima Daiichi incident who have been credi-
tors to TEPCO could not receive damages. That
is because shareholders’ liability is limited unless
a corporate veil is pierced, which seldom takes
place. Moreover, the victims, who are unsecured
creditors, are inferior to secured creditors when
TEPCO’s assets, which cannot fulfill all of the
creditors, are distributed under legal liquida-
tion.33) Thus, without someone’s support the vic-
tims again would be left uncompensated. There-
fore, the current scheme, which has made it clear
that the government would keep TEPCO as a go-
ing concern, can be justified from a viewpoint of
compensation.
Actually, the two decisions (that is, (i) not ex-
empting TEPCO from liability; and (ii) support-
ing TEPCO financially) seem to have been made
simultaneously in light of the timings when they
were officially released.34) As a bargain for
TEPCO’s voluntary assumption of liability, the
government seems to have promised that it
would support TEPCO financially.
Meanwhile, the financial support by the gov-
ernment under the Compensation Facilitation
Corporation Act does not mean that all of the re-
sources necessary for TEPCO’s bailout are fi-
nanced by tax payers’ money. Under the Act,
both the nuclear power industry and the govern-
ment shall fund a newly established governmen-
tal corporation (“NewCo”) which plays a role of
the cooperative fund35) for all nuclear operators
(including TEPCO) with a retrospective effect to
the Fukushima Daiichi incident.36) The nuclear
power industry has paid half of the NewCo’s capi-
tal and will keep on paying contributions to
NewCo. 37) When TEPCO (or any other eligible
nuclear operator) wants to obtain major financial
Figure 6: The Bailout Scheme for TEPCO
This chart is available at http : //www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/
pdf/20111012_nuclear_damages_1.pdf (last visited on July 19, 2012).
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support (“special financial assistance”) from
NewCo, it must prepare a “special business plan”
with NewCo because Trade Minister’s approval
thereof in advance is a condition precedent to the
special financial assistance. 38) To satisfy Trade
Minister, the business plan must show TEPCO’s
vigorous efforts to (i) squeeze out its assets as
much as possible for compensating victims and
(ii) take a harder line with stakeholders (e.g.,
financial-institutes creditors) to receive their co-
operation.39) Moreover, NewCo will pay back the
governmental special financial assistance (which
was received through governmental bonds) to
the national treasury40) over an extended period
of many years, using its resources coming mainly
from the nuclear power industry’s contributions.
Consequently, the scheme under the Act can be
interpreted as showing the policy-maker’s efforts
to internalize as much as possible the social costs
which were externalized by nuclear operation,
namely, the losses caused by the Fukushima Dai-
ichi incident. And the scheme also seems to re-
flect WAGATSUMA Recommendations.41)
II. AVOIDING FURTHER DISASTERS
IN ADDITION TO COMPENSAT-
ING VICTIMS
The political decision by the government to
support TEPCO financially can be justified not
only from a compensating-victims objective but
also from other practical objectives to avoid fur-
ther enhanced disasters. Multiple official records42)
published by the government explain well those
objectives based on which it determined politi-
cally to support TEPCO.
A. “Framework of Governmental Support to
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)
to Compensate for Damage Caused by the
Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power
Station” 43)
The captioned framework (“Framework”)
clearly sets forth the three objectives of the gov-
ernmental support to TEPCO as follows: (1) com-
pensation of victims; (2) stabilization of
Fukushima Daiichi; and (3) stable supply of elec-
tricity to Tokyo and its surrounding areas. In
other words, the government thought that had
TEPCO become insolvent, these three objectives
would have failed and additional disasters would
have followed, namely: (1) a large number of un-
compensated victims; (2) unstoppable radioactive
leakage; and (3) power failure in Tokyo Metro-
politan and surrounding areas. Because the
author has explained already the (1) in the above,
he will add some explanation on (2) and (3) in the
section below.
B. Stable Electricity Supply, Stabilization of
Fukushima Daiichi, and “Too Big To Fail”
After the 3/11 triple disaster, TEPCO became
unable to supply electricity enough to meet the
high demand in Kanto area including the Tokyo
Metropolitan region.44) This was because a large
amount of electricity had been produced by
Fukushima Daiichi which was devastated by the
huge tsunami.45) It took time before TEPCO
could shift back to old fossil energy production to
fill in the shortage of supply. Thus, before com-
pleting the shifting, TEPCO implemented the so-
called “rolling blackouts” or “load shedding.”46)
While the center of Tokyo evaded the rolling
blackouts to circumvent a large impact on Ja-
pan’s economy and so forth, suburban areas in
Tokyo and neighboring eight prefectures were
all subject to the rolling blackouts including the
author’s house and his main campus of Chuo Uni-
versity. Under the rolling blackouts, the subject
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municipalities were divided into five groups.
Each group in turn endured power cut-off for
about three hours at a pre-planned date and time.
Electricity to not only households but also facto-
ries and hospitals stopped altogether mercilessly.
The author was unable to commute to his univer-
sity for several weeks and the university was un-
able to hold even a commencement ceremony
due to the rolling blackouts. Because of its severe
inconvenience, the rolling blackouts were very
unpopular and unfavorably perceived by the pub-
lic in Kanto area. (They also enhanced a negative
reputation of TEPCO further than before.)
Therefore, the governmental objective of the sta-
ble supply of electricity seems to be understand-
able for the public.
Another objective of the governmental policy
to support TEPCO financially was stabilization of
Fukushima Daiichi. After multiple hydrogen ex-
plosions and meltdowns of three units of reactors
at NPS, it took a long time before the situation
thereat became stabilized. When Framework
was published, Fukushima Daiichi was still in a
dangerous situation.47) Many contractors worked
heavily and sometimes bravely to stabilize it.48)
If TEPCO had become insolvent in the middle of
the stabilization struggle, chaos might have fol-
lowed. Thus, the governmental objective of sta-
bilization of Fukushima Daiichi also seems to be
understandable for the public.
In addition to the three objectives (i.e., compen-
sation, electricity supply, and stabilization of NPS)
expressed clearly in Framework, many commen-
tators indicated that TEPCO was financially “too
big to fail.” 49) They said that in order to prevent
a financial crisis rippled from TEPCO’s insol-
vency, practically the government had no choice
but to support it so that it could remain as a go-
ing concern.50) While this justification is not clear
from the Framework, practically it is understand-
able in light of the recent financial crises oc-
curred in the United States. The U.S. govern-
ment experienced injections of tax payers’ money
to automobile manufacturers and financial insti-
tutes to prevent enhanced crises, though that pol-
icy was criticized due to moral hazard and so
Figure 7: Stable Cooling Down of Nuclear Reactors Was Essential Policy
Source: Japan Ministry of Defense, Injecting water into Unit 3 of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,
available at http : //www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no 22/photo/photo 10.html (last visited on Apr. 30, 2012).
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forth.51) Similarly, in Japan the “too-big-too-fail”
reason does not seem to be understandable for
the public. 52)
In summary, the governmental policy to sup-
port TEPCO financially so that it could remain as
a going concern can be explained from practical
and political viewpoints, while apparently the pol-
icy is inconsistent with the governmental inter-
pretation of imposing liability on TEPCO. To
compensate victims, which has been the first pri-
ority of the government, the government has in-
terpreted that the 3/11 tsunami did not qualify as
the grave natural disaster which should exempt
TEPCO from liability. Then, to compensate vic-
tims and to avoid rippled effects caused by
TEPCO’s insolvency such as blackouts, unstoppa-
ble radioactive leakage, and financial crises, the
government has determined to support TEPCO
financially so that it could survive.
III. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
THE GOVERNMENTWHICH PRO-
MOTED SO FAR NUCLEAR OP-
ERATION
As explained above, compensation and avoid-
ance of further disasters were the main reasons
for the governmental policy to allow TEPCO to
survive through tax payers’ money regardless of
TEPCO’s (possible) culpability. Moreover,
Framework makes it clear that the government
itself has responsibility to provide resources to
realize compensation as the following excerpt
therefrom states: “In recognition of the govern-
ment’s social responsibility on nuclear energy pol-
icy, which has been promoted through the coop-
eration between the government and nuclear op-
erators, the government will provide support to
TEPCO under the framework of the［Nuclear
Damage］Compensation Act, . . . .” 53) As the
Framework says, the government has for a long
time promoted nuclear operation as national pol-
icy. The government has also heavily regulated
the operation, which means that the government
has been deeply involved in the nuclear operation
jointly with private nuclear operators. Because
of this deep and joint involvement in the opera-
tion, Framework makes it clear that the govern-
ment should take responsibility.
Interestingly, the above attitude is exactly
what the old WAGATSUMA Recommendations,
the origin of the Act, showed as their principle in
half a century ago. As explained earlier in Part I.
A. 1. (a), WAGATSUMA Recommendations took a
principle that the government should finally com-
pensate victims so that no victim would be left
uncompensated “as far as the government would
dare to promote unprecedented nuclear business
as national policy.” And WAGATSUMA Recom-
mendations urged that the governmental com-
pensation should fulfill the losses uncovered by a
nuclear operator’s insurance such as losses
caused by the grave natural disaster and losses
exceeding Financial Security covering the nu-
clear operator’s liability. The interpretation and
policy of the current government (of JDP: Japan
Democratic Party) seems as if it had imple-
mented WAGATSUMA Recommendations as fol-
lows: firstly, the JDP government has inter-
preted that the 3/11 tsunami did not qualify as
the grave natural disaster so that victims would
not be left uncompensated; and secondly, it has
adopted policy to support TEPCO financially so
that the victims could be fully compensated.
Moreover, the governmental support to TEPCO
is to be provided through NewCo which receives
contributions from the nuclear power industry.54)
And NewCo shall pay back the governmental fi-
nancial support (which was received through
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governmental bonds) to the national treasury.55)
These ideas to collect contributions from the nu-
clear power industry and to make NewCo reim-
burse the expenses incurred by the government
appeared in the WAGATSUMA Recommenda-
tions.56)
Consequently, the current JDP government’s
interpretation and policy of the Nuclear Damage
Compensation Act (of 1961 as amended) and
Compensation Facilitation Corporation Act (of
2011) respectively seems to reflect, or try to re-
vive, WAGATSUMA Recommendations, which
the old government (of LDP) did not realize fully
when it drafted and made legislated the Nuclear
Damage Compensation Act of 1961 in half a cen-
tury ago.
IV. DOES THE CURRENT NUCLEAR
DAMAGE COMPENSATION SCH-
EME IN JAPAN BECOME A NOR-
MATIVE MODEL IN THEWORLD?
A. Compensation Facilitation Corporation Act
Does the current nuclear damage compensa-
tion scheme in Japan become a normative model
in the world? The answer is both yes and no. It
is yes as far as the Compensation Facilitation Cor-
poration Act is concerned because it can become
a normative model to show internalization of so-
cial costs incurred by nuclear operation57) and an
objective of a sort of distributive justice/social
welfare.
From the beginning, the losses caused by nu-
clear operation have been beyond a financial ca-
pacity of a private firm, even though TEPCO was
ten times larger than Lehman Brothers.58) As
WAGATSUMA Recommendations indicated in
more than half a century ago, as far as the gov-
ernment wishes to promote nuclear operation as
the national policy, it must assume its responsibil-
ity to compensate victims which is beyond a pri-
vate firm’s ability. Because the Compensation
Facilitation Corporation Act admits the responsi-
bility of the government and also it tries to inter-
nalize as much as possible the losses caused by
nuclear operation in line with WAGATSUMA Rec-
ommendations, the Act can become a normative
model desirable for the other nations too.
B. Governmental Interpretation of “a Grave
Natural Disaster of an Exceptional Charac-
ter” in the Nuclear Damage Compensation
Act: An Over-Deterrent Side Effect
1. Exemption Limited to Disasters “Beyond
the Imagination of Humankind”
But as to an issue of “a grave natural disaster of
an exceptional character” which should arguably
exempt TEPCO from liability under the Nuclear
Damage Compensation Act (of 1961 as amended),
the interpretation thereof taken by the govern-
ment does not become a normative model be-
cause it seems to bolster erroneously over-
deterrence.
As explained earlier, the government has
taken a stance that TEPCO should not be ex-
empted from liability because the incident did not
qualify as the exempting event of a grave natural
disaster of an exceptional character. As a ground
for this interpretation, the government has ar-
gued that the grave natural disaster, which could
exempt a nuclear operator, should be the one “be-
yond the imagination of humankind,” citing legis-
lative records.59) But this governmental interpre-
tation limiting extremely the scope of exemption
from liability connotes that TEPCO should have
prevented the meltdowns and radioactive leak-
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age triggered by the 3/11 tsunami, or even more
huge natural disasters as far as they are within
“the imagination of humankind.”
With respect to this issue, as law and econo-
mists analyzed, we must first understand that full
internalization of resulting losses under strict li-
ability does not, and should not, actually require
that an actor engaged in an abnormally danger-
ous activity should increase her/his precautions
exceeding their efficient level. Instead of that,
strict liability just requires that s/he should de-
crease her/his activity to an efficient level rather
than increase precautions overly to an inefficient
level. 60)
But the public seems to misunderstand the
meaning of not exempting TEPCO from strict li-
ability on the ground that the unexceptionally
huge 3/11 tsunami was within the imagination of
humankind. The public seems to take that gov-
ernmental interpretation as a normative message
commanding TEPCO, or any other entity in the
similar position, to prevent any and all unexcep-
tionally huge natural disasters, including the 3/11
tsunami, as far as they are within the imagination
of humankind. According to this misperception, a
nuclear operator should take all and every coun-
termeasure against, for example, an impact event
like Armageddon, where a comet strikes the
Earth, (and against any other natural disasters
with only a slim possibility61)), because such an
event is within humankind’s imagination. This
misperception creates over-deterrence because
precautions or prevention costs (“PC”) required
for any grave natural disaster within human-
kind’s imagination seem to exceed an efficient
level of PC and to be close to infinite one.
Consequently, the governmental interpreta-
tion, through misunderstanding by the public,
leads to over-deterrence. Thus, that interpreta-
tion is not recommendable as a normative model
or standard to determine the exempting “grave
natural disaster of an exceptional character”used
in several treaties on nuclear damage compensa-
tion.62) The interpretation is justifiable only to im-
plement quick and adequate compensation in a
Japan’s specific situation where unless otherwise
the victims of the Fukushima Daiichi incident
could have been left uncompensated because of
the defect of the Act itself.
2. The Governmental Interpretation Contrib-
uting to a Myth of Absolute Safety
The governmental interpretation of the
liability-exempting event under the Act bolsters
“a myth of absolute safety,” a populace’s unrea-
sonable desire peculiar to Japan. Therefore, nei-
ther is it recommendable as a precedent of legal
interpretation of the Act63) domestically in Japan.
In other words, that interpretation should be lim-
ited to the current Fukushima Daiichi incident.
To explain this concern of the author, the Japan’s
myth of absolute safety should be explained first
in the following paragraph.
The author believes that rationally-minded-
western readers can understand, as a matter of
course, that no safety is absolute. This is because
safety needs costs and because resources are
scarce. If absolute safety were required, it would
take infinite costs. Therefore, all and every
safety has its limit including nuclear operation’s
safety. But a populace in Japan is unwilling to
accept this rational idea. 64) And this rejection of
the rational thinking by the populace prevented
TEPCO and the regulating agency from imple-
menting severe-accident-management measures
which (possibly) might have prevented the inci-
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dence. 65)
The absolute safety, which was, and still is, 66)
demanded by the populace in Japan, exceeds defi-
nitely an optimal level of safety.
Absolute Safety PC＝∞
∴ PC an Optimal Level of Care
As shown above, the populace’s irrational desire
for absolute safety requires infinite precautions
which exceed an optimal level of care. And ironi-
cally, this irrational desire for absolute safety is
bolstered by the public perception created by the
governmental interpretation that a nuclear op-
erator should take all and any countermeasure
against any event which is within humankind’s
imagination. This governmental interpretation is
closer to absolute safety than to optimal safety.
And both the governmental interpretation and
the myth of absolute safety create an illusion that
such absolute safety is attainable. But in reality,
such safety is not attainable. In sum, the govern-
mental interpretation of not exempting a nuclear
operator from liability for harms caused by any
huge natural disaster within humankind’s imagi-
nation is not recommendable as a legal interpre-
tative authority because of the following two rea-
sons: (i) such an interpretation creates over-
deterrence by itself among the public; and (ii)
such an interpretation bolsters Japan’s myth of
absolute safety which creates also over-
deterrence.
C. The Governmental Investigation Commit-
tee’s Interim Report Not Recommendable
to Show a Norm to Determine Blamewor-
thiness for Refraining from Taking Meas-
ures against a Huge Natural Disaster
Another governmental interpretation of the in-
cident, relevant to the issue of exempting
TEPCO from liability under the Act, is shown in
Interim Report published by the governmental
Investigation Committee of the incident. The In-
terim Report suggests that the incident could,
and should, have been avoided. This governmen-
tal interpretation, however, seems to be problem-
atic because it seems to be influenced by cogni-
tive errors, such as the hindsight bias and prob-
ability neglect, as explained in the following sec-
tions, and might lead to over-deterrence, too.
Thus, this interpretation is not recommendable
as a normative model when determining blame-
worthiness for refraining from taking measures
against a huge natural disaster.
1. Preventability Suggestion Biased by Hind-
sight
With respect to preventability of the
Fukushima Daiichi incident, the Interim Report
alleges that TEPCO could have avoided, for
cheap costs, the worst scenario, namely, total
blackouts of cooling systems and meltdowns of
multiple reactors. When TEPCO considered, on a
trial basis before the incident, a possibility of a
huge tsunami, it considered “building huge break-
water walls” 67) as countermeasures. However,
the idea of the countermeasures was rejected be-
cause of their large private costs as well as social
costs compared with the remote possibility of a
huge tsunami. The former private costs were es-
timated as “tens-of-billions JPY of cost and about
four years . . . necessary for construction.” And
the latter social costs were evaluated as follows:
“building embankments as tsunami countermea-
sures may end up sacrificing nearby villages for
the sake of protecting the nuclear power stations.
It may not be socially acceptable.” 68) Criticizing
TEPCO’s decision-making above, Interim Report
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alleges “it must be able to protect［cooling sys-
tems］by designing watertight buildings strong
enough to withstand the wave force.” 69) Then, it
continues that it was very cheap and feasible to
protect only the cooling systems to avoid the
worst scenario. Therefore, Interim Report sug-
gests that TEPCO could, and should, have taken
such pin-pointed countermeasures, even though
the likelihood of a huge tsunami like the 3/11 one
was very slim.
But this pin-pointed way of calculation of pre-
vention costs (“PC”) has already been severely
criticized in a different context by legal risk lit-
erature because it is based on hindsight rather
than foresight 70) as explained in the section be-
low. Therefore, Interim Report’s suggestion that
the incident was preventable was based on an er-
roneous analysis; it is not recommendable as a
normative model when determining blamewor-
thiness for refraining from taking precautions to
prevent a huge natural disaster like the 3/11 tsu-
nami.
Legal risk literature says 71) that in hindsight it
is easy to think of an idea with very limited costs
to prevent the concrete incident because in hind-
sight a person in the defendant’s position can fo-
cus on that concrete incident (i.e., submergence of
reactors’ cooling systems by the huge tsunami’s
floodwater) which has actually happened when
calculating PC for the incident. In foresight, how-
ever, the person in the defendant’s shoes should
consider not only that abstract incident which has
only slim likelihood. (Actually, information avail-
able before March 11, 2011 on a possibility of a
huge tsunami’s occurrence did not include likeli-
hood thereof. And the Interim Report itself sug-
gests that the probability was very small.72)) But
also should the person in the defendant’s position
consider all of the other possible incidents with
similarly small likelihood (such as an impact
event like Armageddon which is within human-
kind’s imagination, if the governmental interpre-
tation has a normative meaning). And in fore-
sight, those possible and abstract risks with small
likelihood could be numerous.73) Thus, correct
calculation of PC made in foresight rather than
hindsight (“PC in Foresight”) should be much
more, and might become irrationally higher, than
the one made by the Interim Report.
Consequently, the way of calculation made by
the Interim Report simply focusing on the 3/11
huge tsunami shows that it is biased by hindsight
and therefore is not correct. Thus, it is not rec-
ommendable as a normative model to determine
correctly blameworthiness for refraining from
taking measures against huge natural disasters
like the 3/11 tsunami.
Meanwhile, the author’s analysis herein does
not mean that TEPCO’s PC were enough to ex-
empt itself from liability. The author just indi-
cates that the calculation of PC in Interim Report
is not correct because of the hindsight bias.
Thus, the Report might not be wrong in another
portion if it indicates that a nuclear operator
should take enough PC up to equal to its risk
which is calculated by the large magnitude of
losses (“L”) multiplied by the small probability
(“P”).74)
PC＝smallP x large L
The author agrees with Interim Report in a
portion which indicates that the risk (i.e., PxL) of
the incident might become large, even though the
P was very small, given that the L was large in
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the Fukushima Daiichi incident. And the author
agrees that the actor in that case might have to
prevent the small-likelihood-but-large-magnitude
incident, as indicated by Wagon Mound (No. 2),75)
rather than by Bolton v. Stone.76) Yet, a factual is-
sue has not been resolved in the Fukushima Dai-
ichi case as to whether the PxL would be equal to
the large PC which would be required under PC
in Foresight (rather than under the original hind-
sight version of the Interim Report’s logic); as
analyzed in the above, in the foresight PC would
become much larger than the costs for just pro-
tecting the cooling systems in a pin-pointed man-
ner because if the cooling systems should have
been protected against the 3/11 tsunami, which
had only remote likelihood, the other portions of
Fukushima Daiichi in foresight should have been
equally protected against any and all abstract
and numerous natural disasters (including Arma-
geddon), which had similarly remote likelihood. It
depends on a factual matter which has not been
resolved by plausible evidence as to whether
such countermeasures can be evaluated as cheap
enough to take in light of the small-likelihood-and-
large-magnitude-of-losses case in Fukushima Dai-
ichi.
2. Emphasis on Precautions Influenced by
Probability Neglect
As suggested above, Interim Report denies
considering likeliness scale (i.e., unlikekiness or
improbability) of risks and urges to take counter-
measures against any risk of a huge natural disas-
ter regardless of its slight probability.77) How-
ever, this kind of attitude tending to ignore likeli-
hood of the risks especially in case of large magni-
tude of losses like a catastrophe is called “prob-
ability neglect” by legal risk literature as one of
cognitive errors committed by a human being.78)
Interim Report seems to commit this error and
can be read as alleging that all probabilities in-
cluding slight ones should be presumed to be
Figure 8: Over-deterrence Created by Probability Neglect
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nearly 1.0 when calculating appropriate precau-
tions or PC. This probability neglect might sat-
isfy a populace in Japan who desires absolute
safety. But usually likelihood of grave natural
disasters like the 3/11 tsunami is much less than
1.0. Therefore, appropriate (i.e., optimal) PC re-
quired under rational calculation are much less
than the ones required under Interim Report.
This can be described by Figure 8. 79) The hori-
zontal axis represents the quantity of care taken
by a nuclear operator. The vertical axis depicts
the costs of care borne by the same. The upward-
toward-right-hand slope of PC means the mar-
ginal costs of PC increase as more care is taken.
The downward-toward-right-hand slopes of PL
mean that the marginal expected costs of nuclear
accident decline as more care is taken.
The optimal level of care occurs when the mar-
ginal PC equal the marginal benefits from re-
duced PL. This is because at that point the com-
bined costs of PC and PL are minimized. In the
rational calculation, q* and D* show respectively
the optimal quantity of care and optimal costs of
the same. Meanwhile, in Interim Report PL is
higher than the one in the rational calculation be-
cause PL＝(P≒1)xL rather than PL＝(P≪1)xL,
as explained in the above. Therefore, the level of
PC required in Interim Report indicates higher
quantity of care (q**) and higher costs of the same
(D**) than those required in the rational calcula-
tion.
Consequently, Interim Report’s attitude, which
seems to be biased by a cognitive error of prob-
ability neglect, shows over-deterrence. Thus, In-
terim Report is not recommendable as a norma-
tive model commanding to prevent a huge natu-
ral disaster with improbability.
Meanwhile, the author’s analysis herein does
not argue that we should ignore the large magni-
tude of losses (“L”) in the Fukushima Daiichi inci-
dent. It need not be said that L was large in the
incident. Neither need it be said that PC should
be large if L is large even if P is small. But this
logic does not justify probability neglect as Inves-
tigation Committee committed. Even if PC are
large, there is a limit thereof. What the author is
concerned about herein is how large appropriate
PC should have been (for a populace in Japan to
make an intelligent decision on whether TEPCO
was blameworthy for refraining from taking
measures against the 3/11 tsumami). To calcu-
late correctly this amount, P should not be ig-
nored even though Interim Report alleges it
should be ignored. The slightness of P (i.e., un-
likeliness) should be taken into account to draw
out correct PC out of the formula and to decide
correctly whether the decision-making by
TEPCO was wrong or not.
D. To Cure the Over-Deterrence Created by
the Governmental Interpretation and In-
terim Report
1. Erasing the Wrong Message Created by
the Governmental Interpretation
The cause of the problem of the governmental
interpretation which leads to over-deterrence lies
on the fact that the old Nuclear Damage Compen-
sation Act of 1961 was not drafted as
WAGATSUMA Recommendations thought of.
Thus, the Act should be revised to comply with
the Recommendations.
As explained earlier, the WAGATSUMA Rec-
ommendations thought that the government,
rather than a nuclear operator, should compen-
sate victims’ losses caused by a grave natural dis-
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aster of an exceptional character. That was be-
cause for those losses, which are beyond a nu-
clear operator’s control, the operator should not
be blamed (or liable). On the contrary to
WAGATSUMA Recommendations, however, the
then government drafted the Act in a way that
the government would not owe a duty to com-
pensate victims in case of the grave natural disas-
ter. Because of the change of the Act’s text from
the WAGATSUMA Recommendations, expected
victims of nuclear operation’s incidents caused by
grave natural disasters have been left uncompen-
sated by anyone. Before the Fukushima Daiichi
incident, this problem of lack of compensation
had not materialized because such a rare incident
caused by a grave natural disaster had not hap-
pened. Unfortunately, however, the 3/11 disaster
occurred; therefore, the current government had
no choice but to interpret that the rarely huge
tsunami did not qualify as a grave natural disas-
ter so that victims could receive compensation
through TEPCO.
As far as this interpretation has the negative
side effect of over-deterrence (especially in Japan
where the myth of absolute safety is bolstered by
the interpretation), the Act which required such
an interpretation to compensate victims cannot
become a normative model in the world. It must
be revised as the original WAGATSUMA Recom-
mendations contemplated. In other words, under
the revised Act in case of a grave natural disaster
of an exceptional character the government
(through a NewCo-like fund collecting contribu-
tions from all nuclear operators) should compen-
sate victims rather than a single private nuclear
operator should.
2. Debiasing Investigation Committee and
Educating the Public
(a) Debiasing Investigation Committee
According to literature on law and cognitive
errors, the hindsight bias is hard to be erased.80)
It is very difficult to erase from a brain the infor-
mation on the incident which has actually hap-
pened when an evaluator retroactively assesses
the defendant’s decision-making after the inci-
dent. 81) That might be why the governmental In-
vestigation Committee was influenced by the
hindsight bias as explained before, even though
Interim Report itself seems to allege that it tried
to avoid the bias. 82) Thus, in order to neutralize
the strong bias which Interim Report cannot
evade easily, it might be necessary to take some
debiasing techniques. But unfortunately, it is dif-
ficult to invent an effective debiasing tech-
nique. 83) Thus, the governmental Investigation
Committee should take into considerations at
least the following precautions (i.e., debiasing ef-
forts) before it releases reports or meeting
minutes, or gives press conferences, in the future.
For example, it might be necessary for Investi-
gation Committee to stop assuming that the 3/11
tsunami and incident were foreseeable as well as
avoidable in a context where readers easily mis-
understand the meaning of Investigation Com-
mittee’s report(s), meeting minutes, and so
forth.84) The purpose of the reports is to build
better preventive measures toward the future by
learning from the past.85) For that purpose (and
only for that purpose), the assumptions that the
incident was foreseeable and preventable might
be acceptable. However, readers of the reports
and the other press releases tend to take them as
evidence to show culpability of TEPCO for failure
to take those better preventive measures.86) But
actually those better measures are proposed only
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in hindsight and are based upon the assumptions
that the incident was foreseeable and prevent-
able. In other words, it is wrong, for the purpose
of determining TEPCO’s blameworthiness, to as-
sume that (i) those better measures were avail-
able before the incident, or (ii) the incident was
reasonably foreseeable or preventable. Those as-
sumptions must be eliminated, from a viewpoint
of neutrally assessing the decision made before an
incident in order to determine culpability of a
person who made that past decision. And legal
risk literature analyzes that a human being is eas-
ily biased to assume that a catastrophic event
could have been avoided and that some person(s)
should be blamed for it even if actually s/he was
not.87) Therefore, to neutralize these biases, it
might be necessary to stop assuming that the tsu-
nami and incident could have been reasonably
foreseen or avoided when Investigation Commit-
tee’s reports, meeting minutes, or press confer-
ences can be erroneously misunderstood as
showing blameworthiness of TEPCO’s decision-
making. To avoid the risks of misunderstanding,
Investigation Committee should always ask itself
as to whether a reasonable person in a neutral
evaluator’s position before the incident’s occur-
rence could and would have commanded TEPCO
to take such countermeasures as proposed by In-
terim Report (e.g., just to protect cooling systems
of reactors) based on the information available at
that time (e.g., only an abstract possibility of a
huge tsunami without any information on likeli-
hood thereof).
Meanwhile, it might need courage to stop as-
suming that the Fukushima Daiichi incident was
foreseeable and avoidable in Japan where an anti-
TEPCO atmosphere is so strong among mass me-
dia, the government, (and the public).88) However,
it is necessary to make some debasing efforts ap-
propriately because it seems that many evalua-
tors of the incident (i.e., mass media, the govern-
ment, and the public) emotionally tend to blame
TEPCO for the bad result. But a bad result
should not necessarily mean a bad decision-
making; a good decision sometimes unfortu-
nately ends up with a bad result, as literature on
law and cognitive errors suggests.89) To neutral-
ize the current emotional evaluations in Japan
which are clearly vulnerable to cognitive errors
as analyzed above, some debiasing efforts should
be made.
(b) The Governmental Role to Educate Cor-
rectly the Public: Decreasing Nuclear Op-
eration’s Activities v. Increasing Its Safety
The myth of absolute safety in Japan, which
has been shared in a sense by both a populace
and the government, is one of the causes for over-
deterrence in Japan, as explained before. In or-
der to make an intelligent decision on optimal
(not maximum) safety, the public should be edu-
cated to understand that absolute safety is just
an illusion. And in educating the public the gov-
ernment (and mass media) should take the lead.
Emotionally it is understandable that the popu-
lace in Japan after this radioactive catastrophe
wants nuclear safety as much as possible. But in
rational mind and in the real world, it is impossi-
ble to implement absolute safety. Thus, facing an
irrational demand for absolute safety, it is a duty
for the government (and mass media too) to deny
it and explain alternative rational calculation
based on a cost-benefit analysis which is not bi-
ased by cognitive errors. On the contrary, how-
ever, the government including its Investigation
Committee, who published Interim Report, has
taken an attitude which has bolstered, rather
than denied, the myth of absolute safety.90) That
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attitude has been irresponsible because it has af-
firmed, rather than negated, a request which
could never be fulfilled.
The cause of such an irresponsible attitude by
the current government might lie on its nature.
The current JDP government has been criticized
as influenced too much by populism91) in a sense
that it has tended to satisfy immediate and shal-
low requirements of a populace such as “bread
and circuses” like the old Roman Empire which
fell after taking such a mob rule of passion rather
than reason. What is required now in Japan is
more rational thinking which would (hopefully)
lead to a wiser intelligent decision not influenced
by emotion or cognitive errors due to the shock-
ing disaster. The government should lead the
populace to that intelligent decision.
Meanwhile, the author herein does not argue
that a populace in Japan should concur in promo-
tion of nuclear operation. Rather (and on the con-
trary as explained in the following paragraphs),
he argues that the government (and mass media)
should ask the people in Japan as to whether they
would accept nuclear operation even though it is
not risk free. Of course, the selection is (and
should be) based on an assumption that reason-
able safety measures should be taken. But it
should not be based on an assumption that nu-
clear operation should be absolutely safe. Before
asking the people’s selection, the government
(and mass media) should show to the people
transparently and correctly reasonable safety
level, rather than illusorily absolute safety level,
of the nuclear operation so that the people can
make an intelligent decision on the issue of the
continuance of nuclear operation.
Given elements of and a principle behind strict
liability for harms caused by abnormally danger-
ous activities and what literature on law and eco-
nomics analyzes on the strict liability, it might be
a correct answer to decrease an activity level
rather than to increase a safety level of nuclear
operation in Japan. The strict liability requires
that the abnormally dangerous activities must in-
volve substantial risks which are unavoidable
even though reasonable care is taken.92) And as
explained earlier, the literature on law and eco-
nomics analyzes that in those abnormally danger-
ous activities it is more efficient to decrease their
activities rather than to increase their safety ex-
ceeding its optimal level. 93)
And as analyzed earlier in this piece, it would
become over-deterrent and exceed an optimal
level of safety to increase safety level of nuclear
operation in Japan to the extent that it could pre-
vent all nuclear incidents like the Fukushima Dai-
ichi one even in case of any huge natural disaster
within humankind’s imagination. Therefore, it is
not efficient to keep nuclear operation in Japan,
maintaining its activity level as it was before the
incident, and increasing its safety level to become
invincible in any and all giant natural disasters
within humankind’s imagination. Rather than in-
creasing its safety exceeding an optimal level, the
people in Japan should decide to decrease nuclear
operation’s activity level.
CONCLUSION
As a Japanese proverb says, it is difficult “to ob-
tain two birds by throwing only one stone.” Ja-
pan’s nuclear damage compensation scheme has
such a nature. It achieves an objective of com-
pensating victims but fails to achieve another ob-
jective of optimal deterrence under tort law. The
most major reason why the scheme fails to
achieve optimal deterrence lies on the govern-
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mental messages, which are consisted of the ex-
tremely narrow interpretation of the liability-
exempting event and Investigation Committee’s
Interim Report. These messages are perceived
by the public as follows: that a nuclear operator
should prevent a nuclear incident (like the
Fukushima Daiichi’s one) even in case of any and
all huge and countless natural disasters which
are within humankind’s imagination; and that
TEPCO could, and should, have prevented the in-
cident. The former perception clearly leads to
over-deterrence because it requires quasi-infinite
precautions. And the latter could also lead to the
over-deterrence because to require preventive
costs in foresight, rather than in hindsight,
against a possible huge tsunami with slim likeli-
hood entails inevitably to require other preven-
tive costs as well against all and limitless huge
natural disasters with similarly slim likelihood.
To rectify the over-deterrence indicated above
while maintaining the compensation objective, it
is necessary to revise the nuclear-damage-
compensation scheme in Japan. For example, in
case of a future huge natural disaster with slim
likelihood close to the limit of humankind’s imagi-
nation like the 3/11 tsunami, a nuclear operator
should be exempted from liability, and the gov-
ernment should owe a duty to compensate vic-
tims. When the government performs its duty to
compensate, it should utilize a fund like NewCo to
internalize social costs of nuclear operation. This
reflects straightly the original intent of
WAGATSUMA Recommendations. And this can
compensate victims without taking over-
deterrent and controversial interpretation which
limits the liability-exempting events to natural
disasters beyond humankind’s imagination.
And to cure over-deterrence which has been
created by the governmental messages and
which bolsters the myth of absolute safety, the
government should explain what it means to limit
the liability-exemption event to natural disasters
beyond humankind’s imagination. Firstly, this
limitation was necessary to evade a worst sce-
nario where victims would be left uncompen-
sated by anybody. Second, this limitation is not
intended to encourage a nuclear operator to take
its safety measures exceeding their optimal level.
Rather than that, the limitation of the liability-
exemption event shows internalization of social
costs as much as possible so that a nuclear opera-
tor would be encouraged to reduce its activity un-
til it reaches the socially optimal level. When ex-
plaining this truth, the government must make it
clear that nuclear operation is not, and could not
be, in the level of absolute safety. Rather than al-
lowing nuclear operation to pretend to be risk
free, the government must disclose how reason-
ably it is safe and where its limit exists. Only af-
ter disclosing such accurate and rational informa-
tion for the public’s intelligent decisions, the gov-
ernment may ask whether the public could ac-
cept continuance of nuclear operation.
The governmental Investigation Committee
should also rectify its Interim Report which
seems to have been influenced by the hindsight
bias and probability neglect. Rather than assum-
ing that the Fukushima Daiichi incident could,
and should, have been avoided, Investigation
Committee should make strong debiasing efforts
and ask itself the following questions: (i) whether
really in foresight, rather than in hindsight, it was
reasonably possible to take such countermea-
sures as Interim Report proposes; and (ii)
whether the proposed countermeasures could
lead to over-deterrence because requiring to take
precautions against a huge tsunami with a slim
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possibility entails in foresight requiring to take
the same against all of the other numerous natu-
ral disasters as well. Also Investigation Commit-
tee should stop ignoring likelihood of a natural
disaster, while it is right to take into account the
large magnitude of losses of a nuclear incident.
Investigation Committee must make its efforts to
show what optimal precautions are in light of not
only the large magnitude of losses but also slim
likelihood of the natural disaster. And after
showing that optimal precautions have their lim-
its at a certain level, Investigation Committee
should clearly show to the public that it is more
efficient to reduce an activity level of nuclear op-
eration than to increase a care level thereof in or-
der to decrease social costs relevant to nuclear
operation.
(＊) This piece was written on and before July 19, 2012
when the author was the visiting scholar at Cornell
Law School. The earlier version of this piece origi-
nated from the author’s talk at a conference,
“3.11.12 Japan’s Earthquake and Tsunami One
Year Later,” held on March 11 to 12, 2012 at Cornell
University, Ithaca, New York. The author thanks
Professors Annelise Riles and Hirokazu
MIYAZAKI for giving him the opportunity to
speak about the subject. And the author appreci-
ates very much Professors Robert A. Hillman, Cor-
nell University; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cornell Uni-
versity; Pablo J. Martin Rodriguez, University of
Almeria (Spain); and Dr. Lorenzo Spadacini, Univer-
sity of Brescia (Italy) for their precious comments.
Of course, errors in this piece, if any, are solely at-
tributable to the author.
注 (Notes)
1）See generally (The Great East Japan Earthquake
Expert Mission 2011)［hereinafter referred to as
“IAEA Report”］; (The Investigation Committee on
the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Sta-
tions of Tokyo Electric Power Company 2011)
［herein referred to as “Investigation Committee’s
Interim Report” or just “Interim Report”］.
2）A possibility of a huge tsunami which could
reach 9-15m in height was calculated by TEPCO on
a trial basis before the incident. Interim Report, id.
VI. 3. (3) e., at 455-56; VI. 3. (6) b., at 467; VI. 3. (7) b.
(a), at 473; VII. 6. (1) b. (c), at 588. But TEPCO did
not think that it would actually occur because the
basis (e.g., location of the seismic source, earth-
quake size) of the trial calculation was speculative.
Id. VI. 3. (7) b. (b), at 474-75. Thus, TEPCO con-
ducted tsunami deposit surveys in the Fukushima
region, which found no evidence to show an occur-
rence of a huge tsunami in the past near NPS. Id.
at VI. 3. (8) a. (a), at 479. TEPCO also asked an out-
side academic association (that was, the Japan Soci-
ety of Civil Engineers: JSCE) to review the trial
calculation. Id. VI. 3. (7) b. (b), at 474-75. Moreover,
while TEPCO waited for the results from JSCE’s
analysis, it began considering countermeasures
against a possible huge tsunami at NPS, by estab-
lishing an internal “Working Group on Tsunami in
Fukushima” in as early as August 2010. Id. VI. 3.
(7) b. (b), at 475; VI. 3. (7) d., at 478. Unfortunately,
however, the incident happened on March 11, 2011
before TEPCO could receive the results of JSCE’s
analysis, which could be received around October
2012. Id. VI. 3. (7) d., at 472.
3）Likelihood of a huge tsunami like the 3/11 one
was thought to be very small. See Interim Report,
supra note［1］, VII. 9., at 601 (alleging that even
though likelihood of the 3/11 tsunami was slim,
TEPCO should have taken measures against it);
VII. 10., at 604 (same). Actually, a long-term evalu-
ation by Japan’s Headquarters for Earthquake Re-
search Promotion, which “proposed a new idea that
large . . . tsunami earthquakes could occur in any
region . . . including Fukushima［offshore］, where
［there were］no records of tsunamis in the past,”
was unable to “identify［ ］location of the seismic
source or earthquake size” or any likelihood or
probability of such a large natural disaster. See id.
VI. 3. (3) e., at 455-56; VI. 3. (7) b. (b), at 474-75. The
exceptionally and rarely huge scale of the 3/11 tsu-
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nami is often said to be equivalent to the one of
Jogan Tsunami, which occurred more than 1.1 mil-
lennium ago in A.D. 869. See, e.g., (SEGAWA Sept. 14,
2011) (indicating that a giant tsunami once in a mil-
lennium repeatedly flooded the North East region
of Japan).
4）Section 7 of the Nuclear Damage Compensation
Act. In addition to the deposit at the national treas-
ury, a nuclear operator can use a special arrange-
ment of a kind of the governmental insurance un-
der the Act on the Indemnity Agreement for Com-
pensation for Nuclear Damage (Act No. 148 of 1961
as amended) where the government shall indem-
nify a nuclear operator in exchange for an indem-
nity fee. This Act covers a portion where nuclear
operator’s liability is uncovered by private-sector
insurance available in a market, such as liability for
nuclear harms caused by an earthquake or erup-
tion. (TAKEUCHI 1961 : 37-38).
5）Section 3 of the Nuclear Damage Compensation
Act.
6）For example, Mr. Yukio EDANO, then Chief
Cabinet Secretary (i.e., the governmental spokes-
person), said, “［f］rom looking at . . . the current situation,
it is impossible that Tokyo Electric would easily be
exempted from liability for this accident.” (FUJITA
March 25, 2011). Moreover, Banri KAIEDA, then
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, said
later, on April 27, 2011, at the National Diet, “Could
TEPCO be exempted from liability . . . ? It wouldn’t
be absolutely permitted, given public opinion . . . . I
hope that TEPCO should behave well accepting its
own liability without evading from it.” (AOYAMA
Aug. 22, 2011).
7）See, e.g., (MORISHIMA 2011 : 141) (the leading
tort law scholar arguing that the huge scale of the
3/11 tsunami was record-breaking and that no law-
yer around him said it was not the grave natural
disaster of an exceptional character). Meanwhile,
my colleague professor at Chuo University, Tokyo,
Professor Shuuya NOMURA, reportedly argued
too that the 3/11 tsunami should qualify as the
grave natural disaster of an exceptional character.
(KUBO 2011 : 506).
8）See (SHIMIZU May 10, 2011) (TEPCO admitting
voluntarily its liability and at the same time re-
questing financial support from the government)
［herein referred to as “TEPCO’s Formal Request
to the Government”］.
9）As of now, “only a handful of lawsuits” have been
brought. (OSAKA 2012 : 458). Meanwhile,
TEPCO’s voluntary waiver of its defense based on
a grave natural disaster of an exceptional charac-
ter itself has become a cause of a lawsuit brought
by a shareholder who has argued that TEPCO’s
waiver of the defense was an error, seeking for
damages on the ground of a rapid decline in values
of his TEPCO shares. (Not Applying the Exemption
Oct. 20, 2011).
10）See, e.g., (Editorial, The Asahi Shimbun, May 10,
2012) (alleging that “［use of the public fund］can
only happen after the bankruptcy process is duly
applied to TEPCO and the company’s shareholders
and creditors are made to pay the price for their
own mistakes. / The government cannot hope to
win public support for providing additional tax-
payer money to the utility without taking such
steps”); (Tepco’s nationalization May 11, 2012) (say-
ing that “［a］nd the public will not be happy to pay
more money to Tepco, especially with so many
lives still turned upside-down as a result of the
Fukushima accident.”).
11）See generally (Nuclear Power Station Accident
Economic Impacts Response Team May 13, 2011)
［herein referred to as “Framework”］. The provi-
sional translation of Framework is available at
http : //www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nu-
clear/pdf/20110513_nuclear_damages.pdf (last vis-
ited on May 25, 2012)［herein referred to as “Provi-
sional Trans. of Framework”］.
12）See supra note［10］.
13）See supra note［7］.
14）Tort law is usually explained as being based on
fairness or Aristotle’s corrective justice, which is
defined, for example, as follow: “a person who
harms another through blameworthy［i.e., wrong-
ful］conduct should compensate the other person
［to the extent of］the blameworthiness.” (Kuklin
2000 : 583).
15）See, e.g., OSAKA, supra note［9］(alleging that
23S. HIRANO : Nuclear Damage Compensation in Japan
TEPCO was liable because the 3/11 tsunami did
not qualify as a liability-exempting event of “a
grave natural disaster of an exceptional character”
and because it was foreseeable). Her allegation is
based on an interpretation that the exempting
event must be beyond history as follows : “‘a great
natural disaster of an exceptional character’ was a
. . . natural disaster on a scale that generally had
not been seen in history” Id. at 444-45.
16）See supra note［6］.
17）See, e.g., Provisional Trans. of Framework, supra
note［11］.
18）(Recommendations by Sakae WAGATSUMA
December 12, 1959) ［herein referred to as
“WAGATSUMA Recommendations”］.
19）WAGATSUMA Recommendations, id.; TAKEUCHI,
supra note［4］, at 32 (a leading corporate law
scholar explaining WAGATSUMA Recommenda-
tions).
20）(WAGATSUMA, Two Nuclear Power Acts 1961:
9) (author’s trans.) ［herein referred to as
“WAGATSUMA, Two Nuclear Power Acts”］.
21）WAGATSUMA Recommendations, supra note
［18］; (WAGATSUMA et al. 1961: 15).
22）See, e.g., WAGATSUMA, Two Nuclear Power
Acts, supra note［20］, at 9; TAKEUCHI, supra note
［4］, at 32.
23）The reason why the Act has become so different
from WAGATSUMA Recommendations lay on an
idea, which was different from WAGATSUMA Rec-
ommendations, taken by the then government, the
drafter thereof. The relevant bureaucrats at that
time thought that the state should not directly
compensate victims whose losses: (i) partly caused
by a private firm’s activity; and (ii) which the firm
should not be obliged to compensate due to the
grave natural disaster. WAGATSUMA, Two Nu-
clear Power Acts, supra note［20］, at 8-9. The
grounds for this bureaucrats’ idea were: (i) there
had been no such precedent; (ii) theoretically the
state should not become liable for harms caused by
a private firm’s activity; and (iii) had the state be-
come liable for such harms, it would have been
forced to pay for damages caused by a private
firm’s activity not in nuclear business too and the
state’s debt would have become uncontrollably
huge. WAGATSUMA et al., supra note［21］, at 13.
24）See WAGATSUMA Recommendations, supra
note［18］; WAGATSUMA, Two Nuclear Power
Acts, supra note［20］, at 10; WAGATSUMA et al.,
supra note［21］, at 15, 17.
25）Section 4 of the Act. Meanwhile, under the Act a
nuclear operator is prohibited from seeking indem-
nity from suppliers or any third party unless the
latter “willfully caused the damage” or “entered
into a special agreement［with the nuclear opera-
tor］regarding rights of recourse.” Section 5 of the
Act. Therefore, practically, a nuclear operator is
the only available subject exposed to liability for
harms caused by nuclear operation in Japan.
26）But see (OTSUKA 2011: 40) (alleging that theo-
retically victims could seek compensation from the
state based on the State Redress Act (Act No. 125
of 1947). But it seems very difficult to obtain dam-
ages under the State Redress Act because the
plaintiffs are required to prove the state’s fault).
27）WAGATSUMA et al., supra note［21］, at 19.
Meanwhile, the reason why the Act added such
conditions on the governmental duty to support,
which were different from the original intention of
WAGATSUMA Recommendations, lay on the fact
that the then government was concerned about
the then small national budget which could not ac-
cept a mandatory and open-ended duty to support
a liable nuclear operator without any condition.
TAKEUCHI, supra note［4］, at 35.
28）See supra note［7］.
29）See supra note［10］.
30）Theoretically, the government might be able to
prepare a new bill from the scratch to enable the
state to compensate victims directly, even if
TEPCO had been exempted from liability under
the Nuclear Damage Compensation Act due to the
grave natural disaster. For example, in the U.S.,
the September-11th Victim Compensation Fund of
2001 (“9/11 VCF”), 28 C.F.R. 104 (2003), was enacted
very quickly after the 9/11 attacks. But the author
is not in a position to know why the government of
Japan did not take such an action. But that action
might be hard to be taken for some practical rea-
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son(s), especially given that Japan had already had
the old Nuclear Damage Compensation Act (of
1961 as amended) which was supposed to govern
the situation.
31）See, e.g., (TABUCHI May 9, 2012) (“The govern-
ment has separately committed 2.4 trillion yen
($30.1 billion) in tax payer money to meet compen-
sation payments arising from the accident. But es-
timates of the payments that Tepco might have to
make have reached many tens of billions of dollars,
making further government support likely.”) (em-
phasis added); (Johnson May 3, 2011) (Bank of
America / Merrill Lynch said the damages could
reach $130 billion if the crisis drags on); (UPDATE
1 Mar. 27, 2012) (reporting that compensation pay-
ments only for the current fiscal year would reach
JPY 800 billion which was US$9.66 billion). Mean-
while, losses caused by the Fukushima Daiichi inci-
dent including damages for victims would reach at
least JPY 5.8 trillion, according to the governmen-
tal Cost Review Committee Report. (Cost Review
Committee Dec. 19, 2012 : 43).
32）(Pilling Apr. 13, 2011).
33）See (Editorial Desk, The Yomiuri Shimbun, May
8, 2011) (indicating that “if［TEPCO］goes through
legal liquidation, repayment of the［corporate］
bonds［of about 5 trillion yen］would be given pri-
ority under the Electricity Business Law and
nuclear-crisis related compensation payment
would have to be made afterword.”).
34）It took only three days for the government to de-
cide and publish its intention to support TEPCO fi-
nancially after receiving TEPCO’s request for it.
See Provisional Trans. of Framework, supra note
［11］; TEPCO’s Formal Request to the Govern-
ment, supra note［8］.
35）The NewCo collects contributions “under the
concept of mutual support among nuclear business
operators.” (Cabinet Secretariat Aug. 2011: 1)
［herein referred to as “Outline of the Compensa-
tion Facilitation Corporation Act”］.
36）Supplementary Provision 3 (1) of the Compensa-
tion Facilitation Corporation Act (setting forth that
the Act applies to a nuclear accident took place be-
fore its effective date). NewCo will support a nu-
clear operator when its liability exceeds its Finan-
cial Security amount set forth in the Nuclear Dam-
age Compensation Act. Section 1 of the Compensa-
tion Facilitation Corporation Act. There are two
kinds of NewCo’s financial support to nuclear op-
erators: (i) “ordinary financial assistance,” which
can be made fundamentally by NewCo’s own deci-
sion, such as granting funds, subscribing shares,
purchasing corporate bonds; and (ii) “special finan-
cial assistance” based on a “special business plan,”
which requires approval of Minister of Economy,
Trade and Industry, when NewCo demands the
governmental financial support through issuance
of the governmental bonds. The ordinary financial
assistance is set forth in Sections 41 to 44 of the
Compensation Facilitation Corporation Act and the
special financial assistance is set forth in Sections
45 to 47 thereof. See also Outline of the Compensa-
tion Facilitation Corporation Act, supra note［35］,
at 2. TEPCO has demanded the special financial
support from NewCo. See (TEPCO Press Release
Mar. 27, 2012).
37) The government injected JPY 7 billion (US$91
million) and the nuclear power industry also did the
same amount. See (Nuclear operators to pay 7 bil-
lion yen Sept. 9, 2011); Section 52 of the Compensa-
tion Facilitation Corporation Act; Outline of the
Compensation Facilitation Corporation Act, supra
note［35］, at 3.
38）See supra note［36］.
39）Outline of the Compensation Facilitation Corpo-
ration Act, supra note［35］. Section 45 (2) of the
Act.
40）Section 59 (4) of the Compensation Facilitation
Corporation Act. Outline of the Compensation Fa-
cilitation Corporation Act, supra note［35］, at 3.
41）See supra text accompanying note［21］.
42）See, e.g., Provisional Trans. of Framework, supra
note［11］; Outline of the Compensation Facilitation
Corporation Act, supra note［35］, at 1.
43）Provisional Trans. of Framework, supra note
［11］.
44）See, e.g., (KUBOTA May 8, 2012) (“Prior to
Fukushima disaster, Tepco . . . provides electricity
to some 45 million people in the Tokyo area, was
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the most powerful of Japan’s ten utilities that are
regional monopolies.”) (emphasis added).
45）See, e.g., (Murphy Mar. 15, 2011).
46）See, e.g., (ITO & NAGATAMar. 14, 2011).
47）See, e.g., (TEPCO, AOne-Year Review of Fukushima
Daiichi Mar. 2012 : 54) (indicating that “［s］tabilization”
or “a cold shutdown condition and Step 2 of Road-
map towards Restoration” was completed on De-
cember 16, 2011). Meanwhile, Framework was
published on May 13, 2011. See supra note［11］.
48）See, e.g., (The Forgotten Heroes of Fukushima
Jan. 2012) (stating that “some 18,000 workers have
been sent to help clean up the crippled Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power plant” along with photo-
graphic images of those who worked for the stabili-
zation).
49）See, e.g., Pilling, supra note［32］(indicating that
TEPCO is 10 times larger than Lehman Bros).
50）But see (TAKENAKA June 3, 2011) (Prof.
TAKENAKA, an economist and ex-Minister of
State for Privatization of the Postal Services, sug-
gesting that it was possible for the government to
make stakeholders take responsibility by nationali-
zation of TEPCO, which could maintain stable sup-
ply of electricity and so forth).
51）See, e.g., (The Presidency of Barack Obama May
29, 2012) (explaining the governmental bailouts for
bankrupt auto manufacturers and financial insti-
tutes in 2008 to 2009); (Bernardo et al. 2011 : 2) (in-
dicating that the U.S. governmental bailout was not
well perceived due to moral hazard).
52）See supra note［10］.
53）Provisional Trans. of Framework, supra note
［11］, at 2.
54）See text accompanying supra note［37］.
55）See text accompanying supra note［40］.
56）See text accompanying supra note［21］.
57) Internalization of social costs by strict liability
seems to be appropriate because nuclear damage
caused by nuclear operation is a typical unilateral
risk, rather than a bilateral risk, and because the
substantial risk of the nuclear damage does not
seem to be eliminated by taking reasonable care.
For an argument that a nuclear damage compensa-
tion system should internalize social costs of nu-
clear operation, see, e.g., (Faure 2009 : 271-72) (ar-
guing that the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. §2012
(2006), is preferable to other nations’ statutes
where the governments compensate victims for
the portions of losses exceeding nuclear operators’
liability caps).
58）See supra note［32］and accompanying text.
59）Representing the government, Chief Cabinet
Secretary Yukio EDANO said on May 2, 2011 in
the National Diet as follows :
At a Diet session in 1961, a grave natural
disaster of an exceptional character was ex-
plained as one beyond the imagination of hu-
mankind . . . . The［March 11］earthquake
was a very large one, but it was of a scale
that had been experienced by humankind in
the past.
(URANAKAMay 2, 2011) (emphasis added).
60）See, e.g., Ind. H. B. R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,
916 F.2 d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.). Ana-
lyzing strict liability for harms caused by abnor-
mally dangerous activities, Justice Posner said as
follows :
By making the actor strictly liable--by de-
nying him in other words an excuse based
on his inability to avoid accidents by being
more careful--we give him an incentive,
missing in a negligence regime, to experi-
ment with methods of preventing accidents
that involve not greater exertions of care,
assumed to be futile, but instead relocating,
changing, or reducing (perhaps to the van-
ishing point) the activity giving rise to the
accident.
Id. (emphasis added). Under strict liability the in-
jurer is assumed to be liable even if s/he takes rea-
sonable care. Thus, as homo economicus, s/he
naturally would take both the following measures:
(i) increasing her/his care until it reaches (and be-
fore it exceeds) an optimal level; and (ii) reducing
her/his socially excessive activity until it reaches
the socially optimal level. See (Shavell 1980 : 2-3).
61）Likelihood of an occurrence of a giant tsunami
like the 3/11 one was very slim. See supra note［3］.
Meanwhile, for cost-benefit analyses of various pos-
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sible catastrophic events with slight probabilities,
including an asteroid collision like Armageddon
(Touchstone Pictures, 1998), see (POSNER 2004 : 25)
(reporting that a 1.7-kilometer-diameter asteroid
collision has a 1/360,000 annual probability and
could kill 1.5 billion people on the earth).
62）For example, the following treaties use the same
language to express a liability-exempting event:
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage, opened for signature May 21, 1963, 1063
U.N.T.S. 266 (The 1963 Vienna Convention); Con-
vention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nu-
clear Energy, opened for signature July 29, 1960,
956 U.N.T.S. 264 (The Paris Convention); and Con-
vention on Supplementary Compensation for Nu-
clear Damage, opened for signature Sept. 12, 1997,
36 I.L.M 1473 (CSC or the 1997 Supplementary
Convention).
63）Of course, strictly speaking, the governmental
interpretation is not a legal precedent in a sense of
a judicial court opinion. As of the time when the
author is writing this piece, there has been no such
a precedent. But the author is concerned about a
probability that the governmental interpretation,
even though which is only a kind of a secondary
authority, might become a de facto standard for fu-
ture judicial and administrative interpretations.
64）See, e.g., Interim Report, supra note［1］, Execu-
tive Summary, at 18 (arguing that the public should
admit first that “an absolute safety never exists.”).
See also (KUBOTA & HAMADA Apr. 6, 2012) (re-
sisting restarts of nuclear power stations in her
prefecture after the incident, the Governor of Shiga
Prefecture strongly asserting that “［w］e cannot
say yes to restarts［of nuclear power stations in
her prefecture］until we are certain that they are
absolutely safe.”) (emphasis added).
65）Interim Report, supra note［1］, VII. 7. (4), at 596.
Thus, for example, even saying just “severe” acci-
dent was taboo in Japan. Id. VI. 4. (1) a. (b), at 482
(“the use of an expression such as ‘severe accidents’
is usually avoided in consideration of social accept-
ability, and use the wording ‘accident management’
instead of ‘countermeasures against severe acci-
dents.’”). Meanwhile, the author has inserted a
word, “possibly,” in the text because he has a
strong doubt about Interim Report’s idea that
severe-accident-management measures could have
prevented the incident. Basis of the author’s doubt
lies on the fact that International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) has admitted that even its severe-
accident-management guidelines (“Guidelines”)
available ex ante could not have prevented the
Fukushima Daiichi incident because the Great East
Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and resulting inci-
dent were too devastating to be managed by the
Guidelines. See IAEA Report, supra note［1］, Sum-
mary, at 49-50, 54.
66）See KUBOTA & HAMADA, supra note［64］
(the Governor assering absolute safety even after
publication of the governmental Investigation
Committee’s Interim Report which has requested
the public to abandon such an irrational myth).
67）Interim Report, supra note［1］, VI. 3. (7) b. (b), at
468-70.
68）Id. at 478, 470.
69）Id. VI. 5.(2), at 542-43.
70）(Viscusi 2000 : 586-87).
71）See id.
72）See, e.g., Interim Report, supra note［1］, VII. 9., at
601; VII. 10., at 604.
73) Actually, TEPCO’s personnel testified as follows:
“Yes, in hindsight, we were not sufficiently pre-
pared at TEPCO, in terms of awareness and or-
ganization, to introduce comprehensive meas-
ures to address the risk of natural disasters”;
“We never thought of the occurrence of natural
disasters beyond design basis assumptions”;
and “We believed that if one were to begin to
assume an external event in the form of a natu-
ral disaster there’d be no end to it.
Id. VII. 6. (2) a., at 590 (emphasis added).
74）The formula used herein is based on the famous
Hand Formula (“B＜PL“) in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2 d 169 (2d. Cir. 1947). Even un-
der strict liability, a cost-benefit analysis based on
Hand Formula seems to be useful to draw out an
optimal level of care under an approach balancing
risk (i.e., PxL) against precautions (that is PC in this
piece and B or burden in Hand Formula). More-
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over, even under strict liability, reasonable foresee-
ability of a force majeure event and reasonable pre-
ventability of losses caused thereby are elements
of an affirmative defense based on the force ma-
jeure. In that sense, elements of reasonable (fore-
seeability and) preventability of losses caused by a
natural disaster under strict liability resemble
those of negligence. See (Binder 1996 : 65) (indicat-
ing that “［t］his concept of reasonableness［under
negligence liability］is mirrored by the［strict li-
ability’s］act of God cases in which courts provide
that an act of God exists only when reasonable
foreseeability and reasonable measures would not
prevent the incident.” (emphasis added)). And as
the following Professor TAKEUCHI’s comment clear-
ly shows, reasonably practicable costs of preven-
tion are an element to determine whether the natu-
ral disaster like the 3/11 tsunami qualifies as the
liability-exempting event of “a grave natural disas-
ter of an exceptional disaster”: TAKEUCHI, supra
note［4］, at 31 (a leading corporate professor ex-
plaining that “a grave” and “with an exceptional
character” under the Nuclear Damage Compensa-
tion Act should be limited to a case which is too gi-
ant to be prevented by preventive measures with
reasonable costs).
While reasonable preventability under the strict
liability’s natural-disaster defense is like an element
in the negligence theory, the hindsight bias in Ja-
pan seems to turn the negligence-like analysis into
“quasi-strict liability” by imposing liability on
TEPCO whose decision to refrain from taking
measures against a huge tsunami does not seem to
have been unreasonable. As explained earlier at
notes 2 & 3, likelihood of the 3/11 tsunami was slim;
and as explained in text accompanying notes 70-
73, preventive costs in foresight (“PC in Foresight”)
seem to become very large; therefore, it does not
seem to have been very unreasonable to refrain
from taking countermeasures against a huge tsu-
nami before the incident. Even though the decision
made does not seem to have been so unreasonable
in foresight, TEPCO has been treated as liable in
hindsight by the government as well as by its In-
vestigation Committee. For the quasi-strict liabil-
ity theory, see (Rachlinski 1998 : 597).
75）Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller Steam-
ship Co., Pty. (The Wagon Mound (No. 2)),［1967］1
A.C. 617 Privy Council. In Wagon Mound (No. 2),
the S. S. Wagon Mound chartered by the defen-
dants leaked a large amount of furnace oil into Syd-
ney Harbor. That furnace oil was “very difficult to
ignite upon water” and “this had very rarely hap-
pened . . . only in very exceptional circumstances . .
. .” But, unfortunately, the oil set afire because
pieces of hot metal flew off and fell into the ocean
while some ships were under repairs involving
welding work. Those ships owned by the plaintiffs
were burned. Reversing trial court’s finding that
the accident was not reasonably foreseeable, Lord
Rein decided that “a reasonable man in the position
of the defendants’ servant . . . surely would not ne-
glect such a［remote but real］risk if action to
eliminate it presented no difficulty, involving no
disadvantage, and required no expense.” Id. at 643
-44. In sum,Wagon Mound (No. 2) says that given
large magnitude of losses of a remote but real risk,
a reasonable person owes a duty to prevent such a
risk, even though the likelihood thereof is slim, un-
less the preventive costs are too expensive.
76）Bolton v. Stone,［1951］, A.C. 850 (H.L.) (U. K.). In
Bolton a cricket ball went out over a fence of a
cricket field and hit an unlucky victim who hap-
pened to walk on a road nearby. And such an acci-
dent was found to be very rare; therefore, the de-
fendant was determined to be not liable. This
Bolton is a leading tort case where P was slim like
Wagon Mound (No. 2). But the facts in Bolton
were different from those in Wagon Mound (No. 2)
because in the latter case L was much larger than
the one in the former. Likewise, magnitude of
losses in the Fukushima Daiichi incident was very,
very large.
77）See Interim Report, supra note［1］, VII. 9., at 601;
VII. 10., at 604.
78）(Sunstein 2002 : 62-63).
79）Figure 8 in the text is fundamentally based on
the idea shown in (POSNER 1992 : 165, fig. 6.1).
80）See (Rachlinski 1999 : 823) (indicating that “The
hindsight has proven difficulty to avoid. . . . . The
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hindsight bias, however, is resistant to all debiasing
techniques. This failure has arisen because the
bias results not merely from an inability to sup-
press or ignore knowledge of the outcome but from
the natural tendency to use outcome knowledge to
make further inferences.”).
81）The cause of difficulty to debias the hindsight
bias can be explained plausibly as follows : “When
assessing the predictability of past events, how-
ever, the outcome must be ignored. Perhaps be-
cause such judgments are so uncommon and un-
natural, people have difficulty making them accu-
rately.” Id. at 824.
82）See Interim Report, supra note［1］, I. 3., at 5.
Meanwhile, other than this piece, the following
news article (comment) criticizes Investigation
Committee’s Interim Report for its erroneous prob-
ability neglect and its arrogant attitude to blame
TEMPCO in hindsight: (HIGASHITANI Jan. 11, 2012).
83）See supra note［80］.
84）Not only formal reports released by Investiga-
tion Committee but also (informal) information re-
leased or leaked during its investigation can be
misunderstood by mass media as well as by the
public. See, e.g., (TEPCO Knew Waters Could Reach
15 Meters Aug. 27, 2011) (blaming TEPCO for re-
fraining from taking countermeasures against a
huge tsunami in spite of TEPCO’s knowledge
about a possibility thereof. This news article is
based on the discovery during Investigation Com-
mittee’s investigation and seems to be biased by
the hindsight and was published long before Inves-
tigation Committee formally published Interim Re-
port in December 2011).
85）See Interim Report, supra note［1］, I. 3., at 4. It
states as follows :
The Investigation Committee is working . . .
to clarify what should have been done to
prevent it or to control the spread of dam-
age so that we may learn from the accident
and so that those lessons may assist our de-
scendants to make the correct judgments
and behave appropriately.
86）See, e.g., TEPCO Knew Waters Could Reach 15
Meters, supra note［84］.
87）(Tyler & Thorisdottir 2003 : 365).
88）See, e.g., Editorial, The Asahi Shimbun, May 10,
2012, supra note［10］. See also OSAKA, supra note
［9］, at 433 (indicating that “TEPCO . . . has drawn
heavy criticism from around the world” without
any citation).
89）As an example of a legal rule which reflects a
concept where even a good decision sometimes (or
often?) ends unfortunately in a bad result, please
consider the business judgment rule for D&O’s li-
ability in a corporation. An impartial manage-
ment’s risk-taking decision, for example, an M&A
decision to buy a firm in exchange for a certain
value, after fully informed of and discussing on the
proposed purchase does not have to result in prof-
its after, say, five years even though financial advis-
ers predicted that the target firm would become lu-
crative after the five years. If the business judg-
ment rule did not protect the management in the
above scenario, which the author himself experi-
enced often as an inhouse attorney at big corpora-
tions in Japan, business activities in general would
become shrunk. For the psychological explanation
of the business judgment rule, see, e.g., Rachlinski,
Judging in Hindsight, supra note［74］, at 620-21.
90）The fact that Investigation Committee bolsters a
myth of absolute safety is ironical because its Re-
port argues that the public should admit first that
“an absolute safety never exists.” Interim Report,
supra note［1］, Executive Summary, at 18. On the
contrary to its argument, Interim Report, which is
influenced by, for example, probability neglect
(that is, P≒1.0) as analyzed earlier in Part IV C. 2,
ends up with over-deterrence like absolute safety.
91）The government organized by Japan Demo-
cratic Party (JPD) is criticized as “too much influ-
enced by populism.” (CEO of Tokyo Stock Exchange
Argues for Legal Liquidation of TEPCO June 4,
2011) (The CEO of Tokyo Stock Exchange, who
handled reorganizations of famous Japanese big
firms, saying that the current government was too
much influenced by populism.).
92）RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520 (c) (an activ-
ity is determined as “abnormally dangerous” in
light of, inter alia, “inability to eliminate the risk by
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the exercise of reasonable care”). 93）See supra note［60］.
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